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The scientific understanding of the driving factors
behind zoonotic and pandemic influenzas is hampered
by complex interactions between viruses, animal
hosts and humans. This complexity makes identifying
influenza viruses of high zoonotic or pandemic
risk, before they emerge from animal populations,
extremely difficult and uncertain. As a first step
towards assessing zoonotic risk of Influenza, we
demonstrate a risk assessment framework to assess
the relative likelihood of influenza A viruses,
circulating in animal populations, making the species
jump into humans. The intention is that such a
risk assessment framework could assist decision-
makers to compare multiple influenza viruses for
zoonotic potential and hence to develop appropriate
strain-specific control measures. It also provides a
first step towards showing proof of principle for an
eventual pandemic risk model. We show that the
spatial and temporal epidemiology is as important in
assessing the risk of an influenza A species jump as
understanding the innate molecular capability of the
virus. We also demonstrate data deficiencies that need
to be addressed in order to consistently combine both
epidemiological and molecular virology data into a
risk assessment framework.
c© 2014 The Authors. Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/4.0/, which permits unrestricted use, provided the original author and
source are credited.
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1. Introduction
The interaction between animals and humans is a major source of emerging infectious diseases,
some of which have the potential to cause human mortality, and some have and will cause
global pandemics [1]. Zoonotic pathogens with pandemic potential include influenza A viruses,
which caused the 1918 Spanish flu and 2009 H1N1 swine flu pandemics [2,3]. Indeed, the latter
caught the scientific community by surprise as much attention had been focused on a pandemic
originating from avian influenzas such as highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1. While
there may still be potential for HPAI H5N1 to evolve into a pandemic virus, it is more accurately a
waterfowl and poultry disease, which through widespread dissemination in poultry populations
has managed to cause numerous human cases and fatalities. This example shows that we are still
a long way from being able to accurately assess and distinguish between emerging, potentially
zoonotic and potentially pandemic viruses. However, we must develop risk assessment tools
to assess zoonotic and pandemic potential - at suitably early stages of emergence - if we are to
efficiently allocate scarce resources on surveillance and controls.
Most pandemic pathogens originate in animals and are driven to emerge by ecological,
behavioural or socio-economic changes [1]. Broadly speaking, pandemic potential can be realised
through three distinct stages: first, the equilibrium of an animal disease is disturbed by ecological
change (for example, human encroachment on wildlife habitat) that increases the likelihood of
a species jump from the original animal host to another non-human wild species or livestock;
second, local emergence in humans occurs through either sporadic cases or self-limiting person-
to-person spread before dying out; finally, sustained person-to-person transmission occurs,
enabling national or international spread of human disease and eventually a pandemic [1].
There is still much ongoing debate over the driving factors behind the emergence of
influenza pandemics [3–5]; the science is hampered by complex environmental and evolutionary
interactions and feedback loops. While contributory factors such as climate, farming practices
and viral genetic reassortment have been postulated [3,5–7], their role in pandemic development
remains unclear. Without a better appreciation of the epidemiology of pandemic development
any pandemic risk model will be subject to huge uncertainty. However, in order to work towards
the goal of a tool that can be used to assess the risk of emerging influenzas causing zoonotic
infections and eventually a pandemic, we can approach the task from first principles of disease
transmission. We take the second stage of pandemic evolution, livestock-human infection, as a
more manageable proof of principle (due to better defined contact structures and relatively more
data).
We therefore aim to address the problem of identifying which influenza strains are more likely
to jump the species barrier and cause zoonotic infections, a prerequisite for a pandemic. Here
we describe the development of a risk assessment framework, based on general principles of
disease transmission and risk, to assist decision-makers in their ability to rank influenza viruses,
currently circulating in livestock, for their zoonotic potential. This will prioritise influenza strains
potentially worthy of control measures. The earlier on in the chain of events a potentially zoonotic
strain can be identified, the longer the warning and the more time available to prepare a vaccine
or control the outbreak in animals. Our case studies relate to avian influenza (where we havemost
data).
Influenza A has a natural reservoir in wild aquatic birds [2]. Both the HPAI H5N1 and the
low-pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) H7N9 strain that emerged in China in 2013 have wild
bird origins [8,9] but are now found in domestic poultry. Human contact with infected poultry
is believed to be the cause of the majority of human infections [10]. We have chosen HPAI
H5N1 and China H7N9 as representative viruses that have reasonably good data available. We
used associated molecular and epidemiological data to derive a model from mathematical first
principles that can be applied to any influenza organism to assess the relative spatial risk of human
infection. Essentially we have built a prototype tool that has breadth of coverage, both spatially
and across influenza strains, whereas previously most risk assessments and models have focused
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on detailed analysis of one single strain.We believe this makes ourmodel muchmore amenable to
decision-making and the allocation of resources. A novel viral molecular scoring system has also
been incorporated into the model to characterise influenzas in their innate ability to cause human
infection. We chose the case studies on the basis of available data and their relevance to sporadic,
zoonotic infections, not pandemic potential (although both are still viewed with concern).
2. Methods
(a) Model framework
We used standard disease transmission modelling principles [11] in order to assess the relative
ability of individual virus strains circulating in animal populations to cause human infection. In
essence, in order for zoonotic transmission to occur theremust be infected animals within effective
transmission range of susceptible humans, where the number of contacts is proportional to the
product of the number of infected animals and susceptible animals. There is some efficiency of
transmission, which will vary according to the extent and intensity of contact between livestock
and humans (e.g. commercial versus backyard production) and the innate efficiency of the virus
to cause human infection (dependent on known or unknown genetic characteristics) [1,3,5].
These kinematics of infection imply two fundamental properties that must be considered when
assessing risk: the opportunity for exposure of humans to the virus, and the capability of the
virus to cause human infection. The former implies that any assessment of risk must be spatially
dependent; the latter requires the development of a novel algorithm to assess the innate ability
of a novel influenza virus to cause human infection, based on known genetic characteristics (see
supplementary information and [12]).
The most appropriate model framework was to modify the classical epidemiological risk
equation [13] which was then applied within a global spatial framework using standard GIS
methodology. First we assessed the global contact intensity as a global indicator for the level of
opportunity for exposure to humans from influenza viruses. The interactions between domestic
and livestock animals and people will be different across the globe, but an intuitive contributing
factor will be whether the animals are raised in a commercial or backyard production system.
Therefore, an appropriate equation for the contact intensity within a cell g, γ (g), is
γ (g) =
∑
j
w (j)C (g, j)2 , (2.1)
where we denote the number of animals of production type j (j = {commercial, backyard})
within cell g byC (g, j) and the contact ratio with humans byw (j). It is important to note that this
contact intensity is independent of influenza-specific parameters and hence is broadly applicable
to all zoonotic organisms that depend on livestock-human interaction.
We assess risk by incorporating strain-specific information on the known location of livestock
outbreaks along with an assessment of the innate capability of the virus to cause human infection.
We therefore denote the risk of (one or more) human infections, given the presence of influenza
strain i in cell g at time t as
R (i, g, t)∼
∑
j={comm,back}
1− e−V (i)p(i,g,t)β˜(j)γ(g). (2.2)
The transmission coefficient between chickens and humans is a summary term incorporating
both host-specific (β˜ (j)) and virus-specific (V (i)) components. The true prevalence of virus strain
i at time t, p (i, g, t), was estimated by applying a spatial kernel to the number of outbreaks in a
location within a 6 month period before and during the first human cases of a zoonotic outbreak,
adjusting for under-reporting. That is, p (i, g, t)∼ nˆ (i, g, t)U (g), where nˆ (i, g, t) is the normalised
density estimator for cell g, and U (g) is the relevant under-reporting factor for HPAI or LPAI
dependent on the type of surveillance conducted by a country (active or passive or both). The
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virus score, V (i)was determined using an algorithm based on the genetic factors most associated
with the chronology of viral infection (attachment, replication, release).
The results of the model are intended to reflect the relative risk of human infection by
comparing (novel) influenzas circulating in livestock populations: as such theremust be a baseline
from which to compare the relative risks. The normalisation value is set as the maximum risk
value achieved throughout the globe, which will be the cell with the highest contact intensity and
V (i) = 1. All other values are then normalised against this maximum risk value. Hence the peak
risk value of 2.57× 10−4 for H5N1 Clade 1 reported in the results, is approximately 1/3890th of
the maximum risk value possible.
(b) Parameter estimation
The model framework was parameterised for domestic chicken to human transmission only;
the initial intention was to include swine influenza as well, but data were lacking to be able to
rigorously quantify parameters for this livestock species. We demonstrated proof of concept by
estimating the zoonotic risk of HPAI H5N1 in south-east Asia in 2003-2004 and China H7N9 in
2013-2014 (that is, at the time of their emergence in humans), although in theory the model is
applicable to any influenza A strain and livestock species pairing.
Parameter estimates are given in Table 1; key parameter estimates are also shown in 1. The
genetic characteristics and the associated virus scores for two HPAI H5N1 strains (Clades 1 and
2) from 2003-2004 and four China H7N9 profiles from 2013 are given in Table 2.
Table 1. Summary of parameter estimates
Notation Description Value - Mean (1st,
99th percentile)
C (comm, g) Number of commercial domestic chickens per cell 6293 (0, 16883)
C (back, g) Number of backyard domestic chickens per cell 1654 (0,6331)
w (comm) Contact ratio between commercial chickens and people 5.2× 10−4 (4.8×
10−5,9.8× 10−4)
w (back) Contact ratio between backyard chickens and people 0.51 (0.03,0.99)
β˜ (comm) Transmission parameter: commercial chickens→ humans 2.03× 10−7 (1.16×
10−9,1.32× 10−6)
β˜ (back) Transmission parameter: backyard chickens→ humans 1.63× 10−6 (6.05×
10−8,5.62× 10−6)
nˆ (i, g, t) Normalised density estimator See Supplementary
Information
U (active) Under-reporting factor for active surveillance of HPAI
and LPAI
8.2 (1.0,99.7)
U (passive) Under-reporting factor for active surveillance of HPAI 286.1 (1.0,1000.0)
U (both) Under-reporting factor for both active and passive
surveillance of HPAI and LPAI
7.7 (1.0,108.4)
Commercial and backyard chicken population density at a resolution of 0.08 pixels (between
5-80km2 depending on latitude) was supplied by the Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations (FAO) (see Figure 1). A full description of the density estimates are given
in the accompanying paper to the ongoing FAO Gridded Livestock of the World project [14].
Briefly, reported sub-national livestock statistics are collected and cleaned. Appropriate habitats
for domestic chickens (commercial and backyard) were identified by applying various GIS masks
(for example, excluding lakes and steep mountains as suitable habitats). Livestock densities
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Figure 1. a Probability distributions for β˜ (back) (Egypt, Thailand) and β˜ (comm) (others), b Under reporting factor
distributions for active and combined surveillance systems (both HPAI and LPAI) and passive (HPAI only) (Central red
line - median, box approx 25/75th percentiles, whiskers approx 1st and 99th percentile), c and d Global domestic chicken
population densities, backyard and commercial production systems respectively [14].
are then calculated by implementing spatially stratified, statistical regression models that test
a number of predictor environmental variables for relevance. The main spatial dataset used in the
statistical modelling is a Fourier-processed Decadal time series of geophysical variables derived
from Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS) satellite data from 2001 to 2008.
The variables include two vegetation indices, land surface temperature and the band 3 middle-
infra-red, which is used to assist in vegetation mapping. Predicted densities are then compared
and adjusted against livestock statistics to provide a final validation. All spatially-dependent
parameters used in the model were resampled to match the commercially-reared density dataset
(at an approximate resolution of 0.08 degrees).
The relative weighting of contact between chickens and humans (wj ) will be different for
commercial and backyard chickens, where the former will be reared by relatively few people
compared to backyard chickens, which will be reared by hand by one or two people. We assume
that the ratio of chicken to humans for backyard chickens is 1:1 [15] and of the order of 10,000:1
for backyard production (assuming that commercial flock sizes are in the tens of thousands and
there would be a small number of farm workers looking after each flock). We have placed some
uncertainty around these average contact ratios based on our own intuition (between 1:1 and 50:1
for backyard production and between 1,000:1 and 25,000:1 for commercial production). For the
contact intensity model, where values are normalised and hence the variation in contact ratios
has no effect on the relative values, point values of 1× 10−4 and 1 were used for commercial and
backyard contact ratios respectively.
The epidemiological component of the transmission parameter (β˜ (j)) was generated from
published real-world reports of avian influenza (AI) outbreaks [16–26]. The normalised virus
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density, nˆi, was estimated by applying a spatial kernel estimator to extracted livestock species
and location data of AI outbreaks from the Empres-i animal disease information database
maintained by FAO [27], which was merged with information of genetic sequencing from
OpenFluDB, a publicly available influenza-specialized database developed by the Swiss Institute
for Bioinformatics (SIB) that contains genomic and protein influenza virus sequences [28]. The
under-reporting factors for active and passive surveillance of HPAI and LPAI were estimated
from several studies that have estimated the sensitivity of active and passive surveillance systems
(SSe) for individual countries. For example, the overall distribution for HPAI passive surveillance
was generated from resampling from individual distributions for Spain, New Zealand, Nigeria
and Denmark [29–31]. Further information on the derivation of parameter estimates, including
the transmission parameter, virus score and under-reporting factor, is given in the electronic
Supplementary Information and [12].
(c) Uncertainty Analysis
There are a number of uncertain parameter estimates within the model: (β˜ (j), w (commercial)
and V (i)). For the uncertainty analysis the 25th, 50th, 75th and 99th percentile values of the
product of ten thousand random samples from each of these distributions are used as inputs
into the rest of the risk equation (Equation 2). The end result is a highly uncertain output for
R (i, j, t), stretching over several orders of magnitude from the 25th to 99th percentile. Most of
the uncertainty range is attributable to the transmission parameter β˜ (j), which has a range over
six (j - commercial) and three (j - backyard) orders of magnitude, see Figure 1.
3. Results
(a) Global contact intensity, γ (g)
By mapping contact intensity, we have identified the high–risk areas for any zoonotic infection
that relies on human interaction with domestic chickens (Figure 2). This simple method,
converting chicken population density into contact intensity with humans, can be used to
target surveillance for zoonotic diseases in chickens and is also applicable to other livestock
species. While high–opportunity areas for AI spillover in South–East Asia and the Nile delta
are well–known, the quantification of contact intensity highlights the considerable global
heterogeneity of zoonotic risk: cells with contact intensity greater than the 99th percentile
contribute approximately 46% of all global contacts between domestic chickens and people,
while cells greater than the 90th percentile contribute approximately 92% of total global contacts.
Almost ninety per cent of species jump opportunities reside within an area the same size as
Switzerland. As a clear example of the importance of contact alone (regardless of virus fitness
to infect humans), cases of HPAI H5N1 during the 2003-2004 outbreak in South-East Asia map
remarkably closely to some of the highest contact intensities in the region and the globe (see
Figure 3).
(b) Relative risk map
The second output from the model, the relative risk map, is critical to identifying
emerging influenza threats before spillover into humans occurs. It uniquely and quantitatively
distinguishes between the risks presented by individual virus strains. For the HPAI H5N1
outbreak in 2003-2004, it was possible to characterise the risk of two virus strains (H5N1 Clade 1
and 2) in southeast Asia. Human cases were highly spatially clustered (see Figure 3). Both H5N1
clades were given relatively low virus scores (see Table 2 and Supplementary Information), which
indicates a low inherent ability to infect people. Clade 1 viruses scored slightly higher than Clade
2 due to the presence in a Clade 1 isolate of potentially significant mutations. Despite these low
virus scores, the high rate of interaction between domestic chickens and people in South-East
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Figure 2. Normalised contact intensity map for domestic chicken/human interaction across the globe. Red areas indicate
the top 10% of cells with regards to contact intensity, which represents approximately 92% of all global contacts.
Asia provided sufficient opportunity for significant bird-to-human infections. The results of our
model agree well with the interpretation of a recent prospective study of HPAI H5N1, which
suggests that the zoonotic risk of this subtype is much like any other AI strain; the difference
being that HPAI H5N1 is widely spread around the globe and hence has much more contact with
humans [32,33].
The overall risk map for Clade 1 is shown in Figure 4. A spatial kernel was used to estimate the
density of H5N1 clades 1 and 2 based on the location of outbreaks with known longitude/latitude
co-ordinates. There was large uncertainty in the results of the risk map (see Figure 5), but the most
important output of the framework, the relative ranking of viruses, should be reasonably well-
preserved given that the majority of uncertainty derived from the “generic" virus transmission
parameter.
Summary statistics for Clade 1 and Clade 2 are that the median peak normalised risk per cell
for Clades 1 and 2 were 1.12× 10−3 and 1.10× 10−4 respectively; average risks per cell at the
50th percentile for Clade 1 and 2 were 2.95× 10−7 and 5.01× 10−8 respectively. The important
result of this normalised risk ranking is the relative difference between the two clades. The impact
of the spatial context of the two clades’ distributions is apparent: the three-fold difference in virus
score between Clade 1 and 2 (Table 2) is magnified by the spatial differences, resulting in average
and peak risk values that are six and ten times higher, respectively, for Clade 1 than Clade 2.
We should therefore expect that H5N1 Clade 1 is more likely to jump into humans than Clade 2.
Within the the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) Empres-i database [27], 288 human
isolates were recorded during 2003-2004 that we were also able to match to clade information
available from the human and animal influenza virus OpenFlu database [34]. Of these, 159 were
classified as Clade 1 and 74 as Clade 2, thus suggesting than Clade 1 isolates were more likely to
cause human infection.
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Figure 3. Exploded view of contact intensity map in South-East Asia region, overlaid with human isolations of HPAI H5N1
in the 2003-2004 outbreak. Only records with longitude/latitude co–ordinates are included.
Table 2. Summary of virus score characteristics for H5N1 Clade categories 1 and 2, and four H7N9 profiles
Strain Virus score,
V (i) (5th; 95th
percentile)
Receptor
preference
Presence
of known
mutations
Reassort-
ments
within
virus
Stalk
deletion in
NA
Phylo-
genetic
relatedness
of HA to
HA of
strains
circulating
in humans
H5N1
Clade 1
0.27 (0.21;0.33) α2, 3 Mutations None Long stalk Different
H5N1
Clade 2
0.08 (0.03; 0.14) α2, 3 None None Long stalk Different
H7N9
profile 7
0.60 (0.58,.61) α2, 6 None Acquisition Short stalk Different
H7N9
profile 15
0.84 (0.78,0.89) α2, 6 Mutations None Short stalk Different
H7N9
profile 23
0.30 (0.23,0.36) α2, 3 None Acquisition Short stalk Different
H7N9
profile 31
0.53 (0.43,0.64) α2, 3 Mutations Acquisition Short stalk Different
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Figure 4. Example of relative risk map showing the relative spatial likelihood of one or more human infections for HPAI
H5N1 Clade 1, for the six months prior to 20th May 2004 (99th percentile risk values shown for clarity). Relative risk on
log10 scale. Black circles represent outbreaks with known longitude and latitude co-ordinates.
The second case study was the current China H7N9 outbreak. Most H7N9 isolates of animal
or environmental origin were isolated as a result of targeted surveillance of poultry markets after
human infections were identified. Hence, there is such a large bias towards the location of animal
and environmental isolations in the apparent spatial distribution for H7N9 that it is not prudent
to run the full model for this low-pathogenic virus. We can, however, assume that the spatial
distribution in chickens was not negligible before human infection. The low-pathogenicity of
H7N9 demonstrates the challenges in identifying zoonotic influenzas before the occurrence of
human cases, and the need to conduct active, risk-based surveillance for low-pathogenic strains
[35].
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Figure 5. Uncertainty in zoonotic risk of H5N1 Clade 1 represented by postage stamp maps - clockwise from top left:
25th, 50th, 75th and 99th percentile. The majority of the variation in relative risk is due to the epidemiological transmission
parameter.
It was nevertheless a worthwhile exercise to calculate the virus score for the H7N9 viruses
isolated from animals and poultry markets (see [36] for reference to many of the animal and
environmental isolates used in our analysis). H7N9 is a well-characterised amalgamation of H7
and N9 surface proteins from wild birds, with internal proteins reassorted from H9N2 poultry
viruses [9,37,38]. As previous studies have also shown, we identified four different virus profiles
for the H7N9 isolates (see Supplementary Information). All of these H7N9 profiles scored much
higher than the H5N1 clades because of their enhanced ability to bind to cells in the human upper
respiratory tract, and the presence of potentially significant mutations enabling more efficient
human infection (see Table 2).
4. Discussion
The inclusion of quantitative data regarding animal production, surveillance systems and
geographic location of viruses makes this prototype model the first truly global and risk-
based assessment of the zoonotic potential of influenza A viruses, and addresses many of the
requirements thought necessary to assess the transition from pre-emergence to local emergence,
as recently defined by Morse et al [1]. The model developed here captures many of the crucial
differences in the dynamics of zoonotic transmission of HPAI H5N1 and LPAI H7N9. HPAI H5N1
is now considered endemic in poultry in several countries (e.g. Egypt, China, Indonesia), but
this has translated into a lower global incidence of human cases than H7N9, which has only
been isolated (so far) from a limited geographic area. This is consistent with an H5N1 virus
that is much less efficient in causing human infection than H7N9. We highlight that the two
case study viruses, each at one time feared to be a potential precursor to a pandemic virus, are
characterised as essentially still avian influenzas, which have simply found new niches to exploit.
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Other factors beyond the number of sporadic human cases are likely to be more predictive of
potential pandemic potential. However„ the results indicate that our method could be used to
provide an initial but robust tool for projecting which currently circulating animal influenzas
pose a greater zoonotic risk, and where.
The roles of wildlife and poultry markets, both indicated as risk factors for transmission to
chickens or humans respectively [39,40] are not explicitly included within the current model.
Rather, the presence of poultry markets is captured implicitly, as a) higher human population
density is closely linked to the presence of poultry markets in South East Asia [41,42], and b)
chicken population density is positively correlated with human population density [15]. Wild
birds have been shown to be directly responsible for a few human cases of HPAI H5N1, but
the majority of both H5N1 and H7N9 cases in humans are linked to contact with domestic
poultry [10]. We therefore believe that this implicit approach is valid for the broad framework
developed here, which is designed to be a reasonably simple model that can be deployed rapidly
and globally.
The quantification of the inherent ability of different virus strains and subtypes to cause human
infection is a challenge, as molecular determinants of transmissibility, stability and host range
are still not fully understood. However, while further knowledge of the molecular biology of a
virus will hopefully in time help to distinguish viruses that are more or less likely to establish
productive human infections, knowledge of the epidemiological situation (e.g. the prevalence of
a virus in animal populations and the type of interactions between human and animals) is still
vital in determining the risk of a future species jump (or indeed pandemic). Therefore, we must
align molecular virology data with livestock, physical and environmental metadata to produce
rigorous risk-based frameworks.
The combination of molecular data with spatial and geographical information has the potential
to yield unique insights into the evolution and epidemiology of pathogens such as influenza.
Spatial, meteorological and/or population data can be used to define ecological or zoonotic
niches, for example assessing the likely areas for zoonotic West Nile or Ebola virus transmission
before or during introduction of the virus [43–45]. The inclusion of molecular data, such as in
this model, allow us to differentiate at a much higher resolution than previously, while also
allowing for potentialy more insight by, for example, associating phenotype or genotype with
environmental factors, or tracing the environmental drivers behind the emergence of a particular
strain. However, such unique knowledge can only be gained by the rigorous (public) collation
and standardisation of data from outbreaks, surveillance and research, which is currently lacking,
despite the recent development of international databases such as GenBank [46].
Current surveillance activities for influenzas in animals are focused on facilitating trade, and
there are only a few programs intended specifically to monitor potentially zoonotic influenzas,
with these few only for intensive swine production [35]. However, these efforts to identify pre-
pandemic viruses are also stymied by current non-standardised data collection practices during
outbreaks or routine surveillance [35]. Indeed, much of our efforts in assessing zoonotic risk
during the development of this model were placed in re-aligning the metadata (for example
species affected, geographical location of outbreak) with the genetic sequencing information we
derived from OpenFlu and GenBank for H5N1 and H7N9 isolates. Despite improvements in
centralising data collection efforts since the HPAI H5N1 outbreak in 2004 onwards, we were only
able to fully characterise 33% of relevant LPAI H7N9 isolates. This lack of complete data forms a
major impediment to progress in understanding the interactions between the environmental and
molecular factors that drive influenza transmission, as both characteristics of a virus isolate are
required to understand the epidemiology of a novel virus strain.
Large uncertainties in the data used for the current model were identified, especially in the
efficiency of virus transmission from chicken to human.We therefore recommend standardisation
of genetic and meta-data collation during outbreaks as a first priority - much more could be done
to use data already being collected to investigate the epidemiology of zoonotic influenzas if the
infrastructure existed to capture data in a complete and centralised form as possible. Further
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specific surveillance for zoonotic influenzas would of course be helpful (and the current model
suggests areas of the globe in which to focus domestic chicken surveillance), but in the short term
a better understanding of effective (i.e. transmissive) interactions between chickens and people
might bemore achievable, andwould providemore reliable estimates of themodel’s transmission
parameters.
Previous risk assessments of zoonotic influenzas have tended to focus on identifying the
molecular characteristics of the strain, the presenting signs and/or the epidemiological risk
factors after human infections have occurred [47–49]. Most are qualitative and reactive, although
there are more sophisticated spatial analyses, for example trying to predict the likely locations
of further human H7N9 cases based on the occurrence of poultry markets [50]. While statistical
correlation is a useful method for describing spatial risk in the context of a specific organism,
it does not readily assist (without large simplifying assumptions) when trying to identify and
rank the risks of multiple strains, as decision makers will have to do in order to prioritise which
strains are monitored and/or controlled. The same issue applies to several theoretical models that
have been developed describing the (spatial) spread of AI in poultry and humans [51–54]; these
models provide useful ways to assess a) how spread may occur in different circumstances and
b) how spread may be mitigated under different control strategies, but are reasonably complex
and focus on one generic strain of influenza. In addition, many of these models remain largely
theoretical due to a lack of precise parameter estimation for a number of reasonably obscure or
hard-to-measure parameters. We face similar problems of parameter estimation, however our
focus on a relatively simple model that requires reasonably accessible parameters does somewhat
mitigate this common problem. This allows us to be reasonably confident in the results of
the epidemiological component of the model, although we still face difficulties with parameter
estimation of the molecular component of the model due to a lack of knowledge about the genetic
mechanisms that drive human infection. However, the explicit consideration of different strains
does allow our model to better realise the aim of being used as a decision support tool that has
breadth of coverage across variation in strain and space.
5. Conclusion
Anticipating the spillover of influenza viruses from animals into people is a daunting task;
anticipating the development of a pandemic influenza is more daunting still. Our efforts serve
to mark the first truly quantitative attempt to characterise the global risk of a species jump into
humans, one of the defining moments of the pathway from an innocuous pathogen of wildlife
to pandemic virus. Even taking this broad, reasonably simple model of the human spillover
stage (arguably the best understood of the three stages as outlined by Morse [1]) demands
almost all readily available data on chicken populations and AI surveillance. It is therefore clear
we are some way from being able to assess pandemic risk in a similar fashion, as even more
known and unknown factors would need to be considered and parameterised. However, the
exercise of developing and using such a model assists the progression of scientific knowledge
by identifying data gaps and inconsistencies in data collection practices, as well as challenging
perceived wisdoms.
To be able to successfully apply our model to zoonoses prevention and control, the
epidemiological and molecular inputs need to be immediately accessible. In addition, a risk
assessment framework should be transferrable between viral strains, livestock species and
geographic areas, and flexible enough to respond to new information. The generic risk assessment
framework we have developed, focusing on local emergence of livestock-human transmission,
simplifies and systematises the current extent of our knowledge around such spillover events,
and remains applicable to many livestock/virus species combinations. It also provides immediate
information to disease control professionals on the global risk of influenza transmission. The
model has been tested using domestic chicken and two well-known avian influenzas, and will
be further trialled within FAO’s own risk assessment systems.
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